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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ~ 
Respondent, 
Case No. -v- i 10788 
JACKIE LEE SYDDALL, ) 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Jackie Lee Syddall, appeals from 
a conviction of the crime of burglary in the second de-
gree on trial by jury in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,iVER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with the 
crimes of burglary in the second degree and grand lar-
1 
ceny. A jury trial was held October 6, 1966. The jurv 
returned a verdict of guilty as charged as to the second 
degree burglary and the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow 
imposed sentence on the appellant of confinement in 
the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term as 
provided by law of not less than one nor more than 1 
twenty years. 
RELIE}" SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
Third District Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the follow-
ing statement of facts as being more in keeping with 
the rule that evidence will be reviewed on appeal in a 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
During the night of August 18-19, 1965, the Glen-
dale Market, Salt Lake City, Utah, was entered and a 
safe taken from the building but left outside the rear 
service door (T.9). At approximately 10:30 p.m., 
August 18, 1965, appellant visited the home of Tommy 
Olsen with the express purpose of borrowing Olsen's 
1957 blue and white Ford automobile (T.51, 52). 
Appellant took the keys to this vehicle and drove it 
1 
away (T.52). At this time, appellant suffered from no i 
physical infirmity; he moved easily and freely. The : 
next morning, appellant was limping on his left foot 
2 
( T.:280). The car was returned on the morning of 
August 19, 1965 ( T.84). 
At approximately 2 :30 a.m., August 19, 1965, 1lr. 
Earl Dunyon was parked in the parking lot of the 
Glendale Market and observed a blue and white 1957 
Ford automobile backed up to the rear door of the 
market ( T .88) . The vehicle's trunk was open and the 
car was bouncing; Dunyon then heard a bang and saw 
dust rising from behind the vehicle (T.88). A man was 
then seen coming around the car favoring his left foot 
(T.89, 183). The vehicle pulled away revealing a safe 
lying on the ground ( T .89) . 
Dunyon followed the vehicle for some time in the 
southwest section of Salt Lake City, but lost it when 
the occupants fired three shots at him (T.90). 
The license number of the Ford corresponded to 
the registration issued for a Pontiac owned by appellant 
(T.9-:1!). The Ford was, in fact, owned by Tommy Olsen. 
The front license plate of the Pontiac had been placed 
on the Ford in June, 1965, when the latter was moved 
to Salt Lake City from Richfield, Utah (T.160), and 
the improper registration remained on the Ford until 
the vehicle was impounded on August 23, 1965 (T.161). 
Olsen gave investigating officers full permission to ex-
amine the Ford (T.94); it was fully searched and paint 
scrapings were taken from the bumper and from inside 
the trunk (T.95). 
These paint scrapings were later matched with 
paint scrapings from the safe taken from the market 
3 
and after thorough analysis at the F. B. I. Laboratory 
were found to be identical. 
Appellant was arrested on August 23, 1965, by 
officers of the Salt Lake City Police Department, who 
were acting on a tip that appellant was aiding an es· 
capee from the Utah State Prison. At the time of his 
arrest and for several days thereafter, appellant's left 
foot was badly swollen. Officer Dave Bradford of the 
Salt Lake City Police Department testified. 
As I stated before it was badly swollen. The 
left toe was about three times as big as it ought 
to be. Looked like an overripe banana. It was 
black and blue and it looked like something had 
crushed it. ( T .238) 
Additional testimony was adduced that appellant 
had been seen with an injured foot "around the nine-
teenth" [of August, 1965} ( T .245), and that the injured 
foot could have been the left one (T.251, 256). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
T H E PROSECUTION SUFFICIENTLY 
MET ITS BURDEN OF PROO:F AS TO THE 
PRIMA FACIE ELEMENTS OF BURGLARY. 
Circumstantial evidence of the guilt of accused is 
sufficient to sustain a conviction in the State of Utah. 
State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57 ( 1960): 
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941), 
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awl cases cited therein. The elements of the corpus 
1lelicti need not be proved by direct, positive evidence, 
b11t may be proYed by circumstantial evidence and rea-
sonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. People v. 
Tims, 171 Cal.2d 671, 341 P.2d 56 (1959). 
Appellant cites the case of State v. Burch, 17 Utah 
2d H8, 413 P.2d 805 ( 1966), for the proposition that 
this would require "strong circumstantial evidence" for 
a conviction. With this, the respondent would not take 
issue. Nothing is more dear than the right to be free and 
men should not be imprisoned on the "merest" of evi-
dence. 
This court has on various occasions set forth the 
criteria for determining the sufficiency of the evidence 
in a conviction based on circumstantial evidence. As 
stated in State v. Erwin, supra, 101 Utah at 400-401: 
"In order to sustain a conviction, the evi-
dence * * * must be of such persuasive force that 
the mind might be reasonably satisfied of all the 
necessary facts constituting the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and where the proof 
of a necessary fact is dependent solely upon cir-
cumstantial evidence, such circumstances must 
be such as to reasonably exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis other than the existence of such fact 
and be consistent with its existence and incon-
sistent with its non-existence. It is not necessary 
that each circumstance in itself establish the guilt 
of the defendant, but the whole chain of circum-
stances, taken toyether, 1n11st produce the re-
quired proof." (Emphasis added.) 
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The facts of this case show: (I) That appellant 
borrowed an automobile in late evening; (2) that appel-
lant was physically well at this time; ( 3) that the auto-
mobile was used in a larceny attempt; ( 4) that one of 
the burglars dropped the stolen safe on his left foot; 
( 5) that appellant was limping on his left foot the next , 
day. The lack of eye-witness identification in a burglary 
case is not unusual. These crimes are carried out in ! 
a manner intended to minimize any observation. The 
chain of circumstances in this case was sufficient for 
the jury to reasonably find appellant guilty of the 
crime charged. State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d no, 307 
P.2d 212 (1957). 
The rules governing the scope of review on appeal 
as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the ver-
dict are well settled; that it is the prerogative of the 
jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to 
determine the facts; that the evidence will be reviewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict; and that if, i 
when so viewed, it appears that the jury, acting fairly , 
and reasonably, could find the defendant guilty beyond 
1 
a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. 
State v. Ward, IO Utah 2d 34, 357 P.2d 865 (1959). 
In a criminal prosecution it is the function of the 
jury in the first instance, and of the trial court after 
verdict, to determine what facts are established by the 
evidence, and before a verdict of a jury which has been 
1 
approved by the trial court may be set aside on appeal 1 
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, it must 
6 
dearly be made to appear that upon no hypothesis what-
crer is there sufficient substantial evidence to support 
the conclusion reached in the trial court. State v. 
Walker, 198 Kan. 14, 422 P.2d 565 (1967). 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTION DID NOT EXCEED 
THE LIMITS OF PROPER CROSS - EXAMI-
NATION OF APPELLANT IN THIS MATTER. 
For his second point appellant attempts to show a 
prejudical course of conduct on the part of the prosecu-
tion to convict appellant by "silent innuendo." Disre-
garding the obvious semantic impossibility of such a 
term, there is no showing that questions asked of appel-
lant went beyond the recognized limits of cross-exami-
nation. 
This court has on numerous occasions pointed out 
the extent to which examination of witnesses rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and unless abuse of 
discretion can be shown in either admitting or excluding 
testimony, the ruling of the trial court will not be dis-
turbed on appeal. State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 
P.2d 764 ( 1949). See also State v. Baca, 102 Ariz. 83, 
425 P.2d 108 (1967). 
The respondent submits that in no way do the ques-
tions prnpounded to appellant exceed proper cross-
examination. 
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On direct examination, appellant stated that he 
met Carla Klotz in downtown Salt Lake City and she 
asked him the whereabouts of her husband ( T.219). On 
cross-examination, it was adduced that Ronald Klotz 
was a recent escapee from the Utah State Prison. Ap-
pellant states he was arrested for violation of parole, 
suspicion of burglary, and aiding and abetting a fugi-
tive ( T .223) . Therefore, questions concerning the basis 
of arrest would be proper. 
These was no objection raised to this line of ques-
tioning as appellant would have this court believe. The 
record is clear that the cited objection referred to appel-
lant's ability to remember dates only (T.224). Appel-
lant further cites a series of questions concerning , 
appellant's marital situation as ground for reversal. 
Counsel for both sides were attempting to clarify appel-
lant's whereabouts during the time surrounding August 
19, 1965. A close reading of the record shows that 
appellant's girl friend at this time was the girl he later 1 
married. The terms "girl friend" and "wife" were used 
by counsel and appellant almost interchangeably so 
cross-examination was necessary for proper identifica-
tion for the jury (T.227). 
Counsel for appellant was fully aware of the pos-
sible confusion in the minds of the jurors as to this point 
as is shown later in the proceedings. 
Q. 'Vho was with him? 
A. His wife. 
8 
Q. \Vell, who do you mean by 'his wife'? There 
seems to be some confusion as to who Mr. 
Syddall' s wife was at the time. So, if you'll 
name names it will be less confusing, I 
believe. (T.253) 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL SEARCH O.F 
THE OLSEN AUT01\i10BILE SINCE THE 
OWNER VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO 
THE SEARCH. 
For his final point on appeal, appellant attempts 
to raise the hue and cry of an illegal search and seizure 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Appellant could well be compli-
mented on his ingenuity, but legal reality must be ob-
served. The automobile in question was bearing an ad-
mitted falsified registration ( T .207) . The investigating 
officers knew the registration was false and would have 
been justified in impounding the vehicle on that basis. 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-142 (c) (1960). 
State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365 P.2d 798 (1961). 
When the owner of the vehicle was informed that there 
was cause to believe this automobile had been involved 
in a crime, he voluntarily gave officers permission to 
search it ( T .95). 
There is no evidence that the owner, Olsen, was 
im(ler arrest at this time. Olsen testified several times 
i11 the course of these proceedings and at no time was the 
9 
issue of the voluntariness of his consent raised. This j, 
so patently an unmeritorious claim that it should be 
summarily dismissed. Howeyer, respondent will reply 
to it for this court's consideration. 
The vehicle in question was registered to .Mr. 
Thomas Olsen. He consented to a thorough search of 
the vehicle. The investigating officers acting on this 
consent took paint samples from the rear bumper and 
from inside the trunk. A search and seizure is valid if 
consent is given. 
There is not one scintilla of evidence of either ' 
dures_s or coercion directed against Thomas Olsen to 
gain his consent for the search. 
Appellant cites People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. Reph·. 
433, 388 P.2d 665 (1964), for the proposition that the 
issue of a free, knowing, and voluntary consent is an 
issue of fact to be determined from all the facts and 
circumstances. 
All the facts and circumstances in the matter poinl 
up the voluntariness of the consent. Olsen knew he was 
not involved in a criminal activity; therefore, it was in 
his best interest to have a search that would result i11 
him being cleared of any implication in it. He did and 
he was. Appellant has no possession or interest in sub-
ject vehicle sufficient to object to the search or admission 1 
of items so discovered. State v. Montague, 18 Utah 2d , 
38, 414 P.2d 958 ( 1966). State v. Pinkerton, J.35 P2d 
661 (Wash. 1967). 
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The most damaging point to appellant's argument 
is the simple fact that at no time during the course of 
this trial did defense counsel, a very able and competent 
criminal trial advocate, make any objection to the ad-
missibility of the paint samples taken from the subject 
rehicle. This lack of objection indicates a waiver on the 
part of the appellant and further tends to support the 
conclusion that those who saw Olsen and heard him 
testify felt that there was no question as to the voluntari-
ness of his consent. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent would submit that substantial evi-
dence of the guilt of appellant has been shown. The 
legal claims of error on which the appellant relies for 
re,·ersal are wholly without merit. This court should 
affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
LEROY S. AXLAND 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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